Reward Schemes, Competition, and Output within Scientific Teams
Published in UMSI Field Preliminary Milestone, 2024
Scientists often perform their work organized in laboratories. As lab teams become increasingly large, research management grows in its capacity to make science more useful and efficient. Generally, management choices influence output by modifying workplace conditions, and thereby the skill, effort, and time workers devote to production. Managers may choose team members’ reward scheme, and one option is to introduce within-team competition for incentives. In science, inter-lab competition is well-documented, while intra-lab competition is understudied. This field preliminary paper reviews prior work from economics, sociology, and labor studies relevant to individualistic and competitive reward schemes and output, and considers how findings in non-science settings might apply to scientific production. A survey and interview study is proposed to address the lack of theoretical clarity on how research management choices shape intra-lab competition and output at the lab and individual levels.
Recommended citation: Zumel Dumlao, James M.. 2024. "Reward Schemes, Competition, and Output within Scientific Teams." Field Preliminary Paper. December 26. https://jamesmzd.github.io/files/JMZD_field_prelim_paper_revision.pdf